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I.

INTRODUCTION

Ohio workers’ compensation laws provide protection to employees for
injuries, disability, or death sustained in the course of their employment.1
Temporary total disability (“TTD”) compensation is available to workers
who are temporarily unable to return to their former employment due to a
work-related injury; however, the Ohio Revised Code prohibits payment of
TTD compensation to injured workers under certain circumstances,
including when “work within the physical capabilities of the employee is
made available by the employer or another employer.”2 Thus, if the
employer makes a good faith offer of suitable alternative employment
within the employee’s capabilities and within a reasonable proximity of the
injured worker’s residence, the injured worker is not entitled to receive TTD
compensation.3
In State ex rel. Ryan Alternative Staffing, Inc. v. Moss, the Supreme
Court of Ohio clarified the standard required for a good faith job offer and
reaffirmed that if the injured worker refuses to accept a good faith offer of a
suitable alternative employment, she is barred from receiving TTD

1. “Except as otherwise provided in this division or divisions (I) and (K) of this section, every
employee, who is injured or who contracts an occupational disease, and the dependents of each
employee who is killed, or dies as the result of an occupational disease contracted in the course of
employment, wherever the injury has occurred or occupational disease has been contracted, is entitled to
receive the compensation for loss sustained on account of the injury, occupational disease, or death, and
the medical, nurse, and hospital services and medicines, and the amount of funeral expenses in case of
death, as are provided by this chapter.” OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.54(A) (2019).
2. § 4123.56(A).
3. OHIO ADMIN. CODE 4121-3-32(A) (2019).
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compensation, even if she turned down the offer in good faith or for a
justifiable reason.4
II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Bridget M. Moss (“Moss”) suffered a work-related knee sprain injury
while she was employed in a second shift position by Ryan Alternative
Staffing, Inc. (“Ryan”), a temporary staffing agency.5 When Moss returned
to work with medical restrictions, she was unable to continue working as a
machinist at Ryan’s client, Ram Plastics, and she requested TTD
compensation.6 Ryan offered Moss alternative employment in its office,
which complied with Moss’s medical restrictions; however, it was a dayshift position.7 Moss refused to accept Ryan’s verbal job offer as she was
unable to work the day shift, because she provided care for her disabled
granddaughter during the day while her daughter was at work.8
Consequently, Ryan provided Moss with a written job offer specifying the
terms of the offer and noting that Moss refused to accept it, and denied
Moss’s TTD compensation request.9
Moss filed a motion asking the Industrial Commission of Ohio
(“Commission”) to approve her TTD compensation request, contending that
Ryan did not make the job offer in good faith because it was aware that
Moss was unable to accept the day shift position.10 Ryan, in response,
argued that it did not knowingly offer Moss a position that she could not
take; on the contrary, it was unable to offer Moss a different position
because its client did not have any open second shift positions available
with Moss’s restrictions, and Ryan’s office was open only during business
hours.11
A district hearing officer (“DHO”) denied Moss’s TTD
compensation request, finding that the job offer was made in good faith, as
it “is not deemed to have been ‘consciously crafted’ to present the Injured
Worker with a position which she could not accept.”12 On appeal, “a staff
hearing officer (“SHO”) vacated the DHO’s order and granted Moss’s
request for TTD compensation.13 The SHO reasoned that while Ryan made
4. State ex rel. Ryan Alternative Staffing, Inc. v. Moss, Slip Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-3539 at ¶
14 (2021).
5. Id. at ¶ 3.
6. Id.; State ex rel. Ryan Alternative Staffing, Inc. v. Moss, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-5197
at ¶ 11 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 5, 2020).
7. Ryan, 2021-Ohio-3539 at ¶ 3.
8. Id.
9. Id.: Ryan, 2020-Ohio-5197 at ¶¶ 14-15.
10. Ryan, 2021-Ohio-3539 at ¶ 4.
11. Ryan, 2020-Ohio-5197 at ¶¶ 17-18.
12. Id. at ¶ 19; Ryan, 2021-Ohio-3539 at ¶ 4.
13. Ryan, 2021-Ohio-3539 at ¶ 5.
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a good faith job offer, Moss also refused the offer in good faith; thus, she
was entitled to TTD compensation.14 Ryan appealed, but the Commission
refused to hear the appeal, and it also denied Ryan’s request for
reconsideration.15
Ryan filed an action seeking a writ of mandamus ordering the
Commission to vacate the order granting TTD compensation to Moss.16
The magistrate found that Moss was eligible for TTD compensation and
recommended that the court deny Ryan’s request for the writ of
mandamus.17 Nevertheless, the Tenth District Court of Appeals sustained
Ryan’s objection and granted the writ, holding that TTD compensation
should be denied, because the magistrate “properly determined the facts,”
but she erred in applying the law when she considered not only the good
faith job offer but also Moss’s good faith in rejecting the offer.18 The
Commission appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio.19
THE COURT’S DECISION AND RATIONALE

III.

A. Majority Opinion
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio vacated the judgment of the
Tenth District and granted a limited writ, ordering the Commission to
reconsider whether Ryan made a good faith offer of suitable alternative
employment according to the standards provided by the Court.20
First, the Court addressed the standard for a writ of mandamus, under
which “Ryan must show that it has a clear legal right to the relief requested,
that the commission has a clear legal duty to provide it, and that Ryan lack
an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.”21
Next, the Court turned to the question of the “Good-Faith Offer of
Suitable Alternative Employment.”22 The Court noted that under Ohio law,
the injured worker is not entitled to TTD compensation “when work within
the physical capabilities of the employee is made available by the
employer.”23 The Court further explained that this requirement is satisfied
when the employer makes a “job offer,” which “means a proposal, made in
good faith, of suitable employment within a reasonable proximity of the
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id.
Id.
Id. at ¶ 6.
Id. See Ryan, 2020-Ohio-5197 at ¶ 36.
Ryan, 2021-Ohio-3539 at ¶ 8.
Id. at ¶ 6.
Id. at ¶ 2.
Id. at ¶ 7 (citing State ex rel. Omni Manor, Inc. v. Indus. Comm., 165 N.E.3d 273 (2020)).
Id. at ¶ 8.
Ryan, 2021-Ohio-3539 at ¶ 8 (citing § 4123.56(A)).
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injured worker’s residence,” and suitable employments requires that the
work is “within the employee’s physical capabilities.”24 The Court
determined that it was undisputed that Ryan’s job offer to Moss constituted
an offer of suitable employment and the work was within a reasonable
proximity of her residence as well, and the Commission also found that
Ryan made the offer in good faith.25 The Court, however, had to decide
whether an injured worker can be awarded TTD compensation if she, acting
in good faith, refuses her employer’s good faith job offer of suitable
alternative employment.26 The Court found that based on the statute, the
answer to this question was no, and the Commission does not have the
discretion to grant TTD compensation under these circumstances.27 Thus,
the Court ultimately held that if the injured worker rejects a good faith offer
that complies with the statutory requirements, even if she does so in good
faith due to “familial obligations,” she is not entitled to TTD compensation,
as the existence of a good faith offer depends only on the employer’s good
faith in making the offer, not the injured worker’s good faith in rejecting
it.28
The Court faced a similar issue in State ex rel. Ellis Super Valu, Inc. v.
Indus. Comm., discussing whether an injured worker was barred from
receiving TTD compensation after refusing a light-duty job offer due to her
inability to accept the position because of her familial obligations.29 In
Ellis, the employee, Susan B. Hudgel, was unable to return to her previous
day-shift position, and her employer, Ellis Super Valu, Inc. (“ESV”),
offered her a light-duty position within her medical restrictions on the night
shift, which Hudgel refused to accept, because she could not work the night
since it would have required her to leave her children alone at night while
her husband was also at work.30 The DHO denied TTD compensation and
found that Hudgel’s refusal of the offer constituted “voluntary abandonment
of employment,” but the SHO disagreed with the findings of voluntary
abandonment and held “that Hudgel had a valid reason for refusal,”
awarding her TTD compensation.31 The employer filed a writ of mandamus
action, and the Tenth District denied the writ.32 On appeal, the Court
clarified that Ellis was not a case of voluntary abandonment, instead, it
raised a different issue, namely, “refusal of an offer of suitable alternative
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. (citing OHIO ADMIN. CODE 4121-3-32(A)(6), 4121-3-32(A)(3)).
Id. at ¶ 9.
Id. at ¶ 10.
Id.
Ryan, 2021-Ohio-3539 at ¶¶ 14-15.
State ex rel. Ellis Super Valu, Inc. v. Indus. Comm., 874 N.E.2d 780 (2007).
Ryan, 2021-Ohio-3539 at ¶ 11 (citing Ellis, 874 N.E.2d at 781).
Id. See Ellis, 874 N.E.2d at 781.
Ryan, 2021-Ohio-3539 at ¶ 11; see Ellis, 874 N.E.2d at 781.
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employment,” which is another possible defense to an injured worker’s
request for TTD compensation.33 The Court considered why Hudgel
refused the offer, including reasons such as “employment suitability, the
legitimacy of the job offer, or whether the position was offered in good
faith.”34 The Court ultimately held:
Whether Hudgel exercised good faith in refusing the job offer does
not answer whether ESV exercised good faith in extending it, which
must be addressed. If ESV consciously crafted a job offer with
work shifts that it knew Hudgel could not cover—as Hudgel alleges
and ESV denies—then good faith may not exist. That, however, is a
factual determination for the commission.35
While the parties debated whether the employer made the job offer in
good faith, the Commission had not addressed that issue; therefore, the
Court reversed the judgment of the Tenth District, granted the writ, and
returned the case to the Commission for further consideration.36
In the present case, the Court found that, based on Ellis, the
Commission incorrectly concluded that the Employer’s “good faith offer is
only one of the several factors” that should be considered, and erred in
finding that Moss was permitted to receive TTD compensation because she
rejected the offer in good faith.37 The Court clarified the required standard
by holding that the statute does not “permit[] an injured worker to receive
TTD compensation after refusing a good-faith offer of suitable alternative
employment’” regardless of whether the injured worker exercised good in
refusing such offer, and the Court’s ruling in Ellis “did not create an
exception” under this rule for situations where an employee who refuses a
good-faith job offer due to familial obligations can receive TTD
compensation.38 In addition, the Court emphasized that Ryan knowledge of
Moss’s familial obligations during the day-shift is only relevant for the
limited purpose of determining whether Ryan made the job offer in good
faith, which is a factual determination that should be made by the
Commission.39
Finally, the Court discussed whether the case should be returned to the
Commission instead of ordering the Commission to deny compensation.40
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Ryan, 2021-Ohio-3539 at ¶ 12 (citing Ellis, 874 N.E.2d at 781). See § 4123.56(A).
Ryan, 2021-Ohio-3539 at ¶ 12 (citing Ellis, 874 N.E.2d at 782).
Id. at ¶ 12 (citing Ellis, 874 N.E.2d at 782).
Id. (citing Ellis, 874 N.E.2d at 782).
Id. at ¶ 13.
Id. at ¶ 14.
Ryan, 2021-Ohio-3539 at ¶¶ 15-16.
Id. at ¶ 16.
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The Court concluded that both the DHO’s and the SHO’s orders showed
confusion regarding the correct standard required to establish good faith.41
First, the Court found that the DHO’s finding of good faith based on the
incorrect belief that Ryan could only act in bad faith if it “consciously
crafted a position it knew Moss could not accept.”42 The Court clarified that
while “conscious crafting” of a position the employer knows the injured
worker cannot accept is one possible way of establishing bad faith, it is not
the only one; thus, the lack of such circumstance does not automatically
mean that the offer was made in good faith.43 Second, the SHO also found
that Ryan made the job offer in good faith because the position offered to
Moss was the only one available within her medical restriction; but the
Court found that it is not necessarily determinative of the issue of good faith
either.44 Moreover, the Court held that the SHO incorrectly concluded that
because Moss refused the job offer in good faith, she was entitled to TTD
compensation, in spite of also having found that Ryan made the offer in
good faith.45 Thus, the Court vacated the judgment of the Tenth District,
issued a limited writ, and ordered the Commission to reconsider the case
according to the standard provided.46
B. Dissenting Opinion
Justice Kennedy dissented, joined by Justice DeWine.47 Justice
Kennedy would have affirmed the judgment of the Tenth District granting
the writ and ordering the Commission to vacate its order and deny TTD
compensation.48 First, the dissent argued that Moss was not entitled to TTD
Compensation because her loss of wages were caused by her rejection of
Ryan’s good faith job offer, which was unrelated to her work injury.49 This
argument is based on the premise that the purpose of TTD compensation is
to offer compensation to the injured worker for loss sustained in the course
of a work-related injury; therefore, a “causal relationship must exist”
between the loss of wages and the injury.50 However, the causal connection
is severed and the injured worker is not entitled to TTD compensation when
41. Id. at ¶ 17.
42. Id. at ¶¶ 18-19. See Ellis, 874 N.E.2d at 782 (finding that if the employer “consciously
crafted a job offer with work shifts that it knew [the employee] could not cover . . . then good faith may
not exist.”).
43. Ryan, 2021-Ohio-3539 at ¶ 19.
44. Id. at ¶ 20.
45. Id.
46. Id. at ¶ 21.
47. Id. at ¶ 23 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
48. Ryan, 2021-Ohio-3539 at ¶ 23.
49. Id.
50. Id. at ¶ 24. See § 4123.54(A).
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the reason for loss of wages is not a work-related injury, but some other
cause, for example “when work within the physical capabilities of the
employee is made available by the employer,” and the injured worker
declines the employer’s good faith job offer.51 Thus, Moss’s rejection of the
good faith job offer severed the causal connection and she should not have
been awarded TTD compensation.52
The dissent emphasized that the majority’s decision vacating the lower
court’s judgment is based on arguments that the parties did not make and
they are contrary to the Commission’s findings.53 The dissent disagreed
with the majority’s assertion that the Commission was confused regarding
the applicable standard of good faith.54 According to the majority, the
Commission determined that Ryan could have not acted in bad faith because
it had not consciously crafted a job offer that Moss could not take; however,
as there are other possible bases for establishing bad faith, it is not
dispositive of the issue of good faith.55 The dissent, on the other hand,
argued that the parties never raised other possible issues regarding Ryan’s
good faith; Moss’s only argument before the Commission was that Ryan
offered the night shift position to her knowing that she cannot accept it.56
Both the DHO and the SHO rejected Moss’s argument and unambiguously
found that Ryan made the job offer in good faith.57
Therefore, while the dissent agreed with the majority that the
Commission’s application of the statute was clearly erroneous in finding
that it is permissible to award TTD compensation to an injured worker who,
in good faith, rejects a good faith offer of suitable alternative employment,
Justice Kennedy also argued that whether Ryan made a good faith offer
should be determined solely by the finder of facts, the Commission; thus, it
was not a question for the Court to decide.58 The dissent argued that the
majority’s contention that the Commission was confused regarding the
standard of good faith was merely speculative, and by “injecting new
arguments into this case” making arguments the parties did not make, the
Court abandoned its “role of neutral arbiter of matters the parties present,”

51. Ryan, 2021-Ohio-3539 at ¶¶ 24-26 (quoting § 4123.56(A). Justice Kennedy also notes that
there are other reasons that severe the causal connection between the workplace injury and the loss of
wages and results in the injured worker’s inability to receive TTD compensation, such as when the
worker voluntarily abandons her employment, resigns, retires, when the worker is incarcerated, or her
employment is terminated because of the violation of work rules.
52. Id. at ¶ 27.
53. Id. at ¶ 23.
54. Id.
55. Id. at ¶ 33.
56. Ryan, 2021-Ohio-3539 at ¶ 33.
57. Id. at ¶¶ 33-34.
58. Id. at ¶¶ 33, 35.
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which is contrary to the way the adversarial system works.59 For these
reasons, the dissent would have affirmed the judgment below, issuing a writ
of mandamus and ordering the Commission to deny TTD compensation.60
IV.

ANALYSIS
A. Introduction

The Court’s opinion clarified the standard required for a good faith
offer of suitable alternative employment in worker’s compensation cases.61
The Court correctly concluded that the Ohio Revised Code does not allow
an injured worker who refused a good faith offer of suitable alternative
employment which complies with the statute’s requirements to receive TTD
compensation, even if the injured worker has a justifiable reason and turned
down the job offer in good faith.62 The Court’s decision provides guidance
in interpreting the statute’s provisions to determine whether a good faith
offer existed; however, it also raises the question of whether reevaluating
the Commission’s factual findings and returning the case to the Commission
for further consideration was appropriate in this case, instead of affirming
the Tenth District’s judgment ordering the Commission to vacate its order
and deny TTD compensation.63
This note argues that while the standard set forth by the Court is correct,
providing that Ohio law does not permit an injured worker to receive TTD
compensation who, even if acting in good faith, rejects a good faith offer of
suitable alternative employment, a convincing argument can be made that in
this case, the Commission’s factual determination on the existence of a
good faith job offer should not have been reexamined by the Court; instead,
the only issue for the Court to decide was whether the Commission made an
error in applying the law when it found that because Moss also refused the
job offer in good faith, she was entitled to TTD compensation.64

59. Id. at ¶ 36. See Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 243 (2008) (“In our adversary
system, in both civil and criminal cases, in the first instance and on appeal, we follow the principle of
party presentation. That is, we rely on the parties to frame the issues for decision and assign to courts
the role of neutral arbiter of matters the parties present.”).
60. Ryan, 2021-Ohio-3539 at ¶ 33.
61. Id. at ¶¶ 14-15 (majority opinion).
62. Id. at ¶ 10.
63. Id. at ¶ 16.
64. Id. at ¶ 35 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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B. Discussion
i. The Court’s Opinion Clarified the Standard for Establishing
the Existence of a Good Faith Offer of Suitable Alternative
Employment
In the present case, the issue was whether the Commission abused its
discretion by awarding TTD Compensation to Moss based on its finding
that Ryan made the job offer in good faith, but Moss also refused it in good
faith.65 The Court, reaffirming its holding in Ellis, held that the employer’s
good faith job offer made in accordance with the statutory requirements is a
defense to TTD compensation claims, and the Commission has no
discretion to award TTD benefits to the injured worker who rejected the job
offer, even if doing so in good faith.66 The statutory language barring
payment of TTD compensation, however, requires the Commission’s
finding that the rejected job offer was made in good faith.67
As previously discussed, in Ellis, a case with similar facts, the Court
held that whether a good faith job offer exists is a “factual determination”
which must be addressed by the Commission.68 In Ellis, while the good
faith of the light-duty job offer was disputed between the parties, the
Commission had not addressed this question.69 For this reason, the Court
reversed the lower court’s judgment and ordered the Commission to further
consider the claim, emphasizing that whether the injured worker rejected the
job offer in good faith also does not answer the question whether a good
faith job offer existed.70 The present case is distinguishable from Ellis,
because both the DHO and the SHO addressed the issue and, after
considering the evidence and arguments, unambiguously found that Ryan
made the offer in good faith, unlike in Ellis, where the Commission failed to
make such determination.71 In light of the above, the question can be raised
whether the Court’s decision to return the case to the Commission to
reconsider its finding of good faith was appropriate in this case.72

65. Ryan, 2021-Ohio-3539 at ¶ 10 (majority opinion).
66. Id. at ¶ 14 (“nothing in OHIO REVISED CODE 4123.56(A) or OHIO ADMIN. CODE 4121-332(A)(6) permits an injured worker to receive TTD compensation after refusing a good-faith offer of
suitable alternative employment, even if the injured worker exercised good faith in refusing the offer.”).
67. Id. See OHIO ADMIN. CODE 4121-3-32(A)(6).
68. Ellis, 874 N.E.2d at 783.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Ryan, 2021-Ohio-3539 at ¶¶ 4-5; Ellis, 874 N.E.2d at 783.
72. Ryan, 2021-Ohio-3539 at ¶ 16.
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ii. The Commission, as the Exclusive Finder of Fact in Workers’
Compensation cases, Unambiguously Determined That Ryan
Made a Good Faith Job Offer, But Erred in the Application of
the Law
The Court previously held that the Commission is the exclusive finder
of facts in worker’s compensation cases, including the question of the
existence of a good faith job offer, and it is in the sole discretion of the
Commissions to assess the weight and credibility of the evidence.73
Nevertheless, the majority found that the Commission seemed to be
confused regarding the “correct standard under which Ryan’s good faith is
to be determined” and “about what facts can establish bad faith,” because
the DHO made its order in the belief that “the commission could find bad
faith on Ryan’s part only if Ryan consciously crafted a position it knew
Moss could not accept,” also, “despite her finding of ‘good faith,’ the SHO
clearly believed that Moss should receive TTD compensation.”74 The Court
also held that the fact that the position offered was the only one available
within Moss’s restriction is insufficient to prove that the offer was made in
good faith.75 The Court explained that consciously crafting a job offer that
the injured worker cannot accept was a “specific allegation” in Ellis, and not
a limitation on finding bad faith.76
As the dissent pointed out, the majority’s opinion did not consider that
just like in Ellis, Moss also argued in front of the Commission that Ryan
knew that she could not take the day shift position and offered it to her
knowing that she would have to refuse it.77 Thus, Moss also made a
“specific allegation” that Ryan consciously crafted a job offer that she could
not take as a way to establish bad faith, and the Commission considered and
rejected this argument.78
In Ellis, the Court held that several factors may be considered in
determining whether good faith existed, such as “employment suitability,
the legitimacy of the job offer, or whether the position was offered in good
faith,” but this does not mean that the Commission should take into
consideration the injured worker’s reason for refusing the offer of suitable

73. State ex rel. Coen v. Indus. Comm., 186 N.E. 398, 399 (1933) (“It is the duty of the Industrial
Commission to decide all questions of fact within its jurisdiction. In performing such function, the
commission should give to all the evidence before it . . . such weight as it finds that the evidence
warrants.”).
74. Ryan, 2021-Ohio-3539 at ¶¶ 17-20 (quoting Ellis, 874 N.E.2d at 783) (“[T]he existence of
good faith is ‘a factual determination for the commission.’ “).
75. Id. at ¶ 20.
76. Id. at ¶ 19.
77. Id. at ¶ 33 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
78. Id.
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employment after determining that the offer was made in good faith.79
Thus, Moss’s good faith in refusing the offer is not a dispositive factor in
deciding whether the job offer itself was made in good faith.80 The majority
in Ryan contended that the Commission only considered whether the job
offer was one “consciously crafted,” without taking into consideration other
possible factors that can show bad faith, yet the Court’s opinion did not
identify what other specific factors or circumstances should have been
evaluated by the Commission in this case.81 Although there are other
factors that can establish bad faith, the parties did not raise any further
issues except Moss’s argument that Ryan consciously crafted a job offer
that she could not accept.82 Therefore, the majority’s arguments that the
Commission was confused regarding the standard as it believed it can only
find bad faith if Ryan consciously crafted a position that Moss cannot
accept without considering other possible factors is not supported by the
record.83
In a mandamus action, the reviewing court determines “whether the
commission abused its discretion in granting or denying compensation.”84
As long as there is some evidence supporting the Commission’s decision to
award TTD compensation, the reviewing court should not find that the
Commission abused its discretion.85 As noted above, the Commission
makes factual determinations, weighs the evidence, and evaluates its
credibility in its own discretion.86 The Commission’s order does not have to
recite all the evidence considered, but it is required to list the evidence it
“relied upon to reach its conclusions,” and explain its reasoning.87 Further,
“because the commission does not have to list the evidence considered, the
presumption of regularity that attaches to commission proceedings . . . gives
rise to a second presumption—that the commission indeed considered all
79. Ellis, 874 N.E.2d at 782.
80. See Id.
81. Ryan, 2021-Ohio-3539 at ¶ 33.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. State ex rel. Pacheco v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, 132 N.E.3d 670, 672 (2019) (citing
State ex rel. Packaging Corp. of Am. v. Indus. Comm., 13 N.E.3d at 1168). Ryan, 2021-Ohio-3539 at ¶
7 (majority opinion) (holding that “[t]o be entitled to a writ of mandamus, Ryan must show that it has a
clear legal right to relief requested, that the commission has a clear legal duty to provide it, and that
Ryan lack an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.”) (citing State ex rel. Omni Manor, Inc.
v. Indus. Comm., 165 N.E.3d at 276).
85. Packaging Corp., 13 N.E.3d at 1168.
86. Pacheco, 132 N.E.3d at 672 (citing State ex rel. Perez v. Indus. Comm., 66 N.E.3d at 704).
See also PHILIP J. FULTON, OHIO WORKER’S COMPENSATION LAW 402 (5th ed. 2018) (The Court held in
Perez that “the Commission has substantial leeway in interpreting and drawing inferences from the
evidence in the record as it is the exclusive fact-finder and has exclusive authority to evaluate the weight
and credibility of the evidence.”); State ex rel. Mobley v. Indus. Comm., 679 N.E.2d 300, 305 (1997)
(finding that “the commission is the exclusive evaluator of evidentiary weight and disability”).
87. Pacheco, 132 N.E.3d at 674 (quoting State ex rel. Metz v. GTC, Inc., 30 N.E.3d at 945).
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the evidence before it. That presumption, however, is not irrebuttable.”88
Based on the above, the existence of a good faith job offer is a factual
determination the Commission should make, and the reviewing Court
should not reevaluate the weight of the evidence in a mandamus action;
instead, it should determine whether there is some evidence that supports
the Commission’s order granting or denying TTD compensation.89
In State ex rel. Pacheco v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, the
Commission denied the injured worker’s request for TTD compensation
based on the worker’s refusal to continue working in the light duty position
offered by his employer and because of lack of medical documentation
showing that he was unable to perform the light duty job.90 The injured
worker filed a writ of mandamus action, and the Court of Appeals
determined that there was evidence in the record to show that the light duty
job offer was within Pacheco’s medical restrictions, but the court also found
that contrary to the Commission’s finding, it was not an abandonment case;
rather, the question was whether the light duty job offer was made in good
faith, barring the injured worker from receiving TTD compensation. 91 The
Court found that the answer to that question was yes and concluded that the
Commission did not abuse its discretion; however, on appeal, the Supreme
Court of Ohio found that “the Tenth District should not have determined
whether the job was offered in good faith,” and granted a limited writ
ordering the Commission to determine whether the job offer was made in
good faith.92
The Court held in Pacheco that the employer’s “offer of light-duty work
rendered Pacheco ineligible for TTD compensation only if the offer was
made in good faith.”93 Unlike in Ryan, where the Commission considered
the issue of the existence of a good faith offer and made a factual
determination that good faith existed, in Pacheco, the Commission did not
address this question in its order, and the Tenth District improperly made a
factual finding regarding the lack of good faith of the job offer, which
resulted in granting a limited writ ordering the Commission to make such

88. State ex rel. Lovell v. Indus. Comm., 658 N.E.2d 284, 287 (1996).
89. Ellis, 874 N.E.2d at 783; Packaging Corp., 13 N.E.3d at 1168); Pacheco, 132 N.E.3d at 674
(In Pacheco, the Court refused to “step into the commission’s role as fact-finder and to reweigh the
evidence.”). See also Coen, 186 N.E. at 399 (holding that the court shall not “substitute [its] judgment
for that of the commission,” as the Commission is the body that sees and hears the parties’ testimonies
and makes “personal observation in the premises;” thus, the Commission exercises discretion on the
evidence, which cannot be controlled by the reviewing court “unless an abuse of discretion affirmatively
appears”).
90. Pacheco, 132 N.E.3d at 672.
91. Id. at 672.
92. Id. at 671-72.
93. Id. at 677.
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finding in its discretion.94 In contrast, in Ryan, the DHO reviewed and
considered the evidence and rejected Moss’s bad faith argument contending
that Ryan knowingly offered Moss a position that she could not accept.95 In
its order, the DHO relied on Ms. Plasky’s testimony and the letter
containing Ryan’s written job offer which stated that Ryan was open only
during business hours, and it was its regular practice to offer clerical jobs at
its own office to injured workers who cannot return to their prior position
due to their medical restrictions.96 Similarly, the SHO also found that the
job offer was made in good faith as it was the only available position Ryan
could offer within Moss’s medical restrictions.97 Thus, the Commission
explained its reasoning for its factual findings and provided the evidence it
relied upon.98
Nevertheless, the majority’s analysis questioned the weight and
credibility the Commission gave to the evidence, and suggested that such
evidence is not necessarily in accord with the Commission’s factual
findings, based on the assertion that the Commission was confused about
the standard for establishing bad faith, and it should have considered other
factors.99 The Court reasoned that the Commission’s finding that although
Ryan made a good faith offer, Moss was entitled to TTD compensation
because she rejected it in good faith is “an incorrect result under the statute,
if the correct standard for determining good faith had been applied,” and the
case must be returned to the Commission for further determination.100 As
the majority correctly held, if Ryan made the job offer in good faith, Moss
is barred from receiving TTD compensation, regardless of whether she
refused the offer in good faith.101
The Court’s conclusion in the present case, however, can be
contradicted by the argument that there is evidence on the record that
supports the Commission’s factual findings and shows that the SHO
considered the arguments made by the parties, determined the relevant facts,
and concluded that the offer was made in good faith, but erred in the
application of the law by awarding Moss TTD compensation because she
rejected the offer in good faith.102 According to this point of view, the
94. Ryan, 2021-Ohio-3539 at ¶ 5, Pacheco, 132 N.E.3d at 671.
95. Ryan, 2020-Ohio-5197 at ¶¶ 18-19.
96. Id.
97. Id. at ¶ 20.
98. Id. at ¶¶ 18- 20.
99. Id. at ¶¶ 17-20.
100. Ryan, 2021-Ohio-3539 at ¶¶ 20, 22 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). See also Ellis, 874 N.E.2d at
783 (held that the existence of good faith is a factual question the Commission should make, and because
the Commission did not address this issue, the Court granted a limited writ ordering the Commission to
decide the question of good faith).
101. Ryan, 2021-Ohio-3539 at ¶ 14 (majority opinion).
102. Id. at ¶ 33 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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Commission’s factual findings, including the question of the good faith of
the offer, should not have been reexamined by the Court, and the Tenth
District’s judgment vacating the Commission’s order and compelling the
Commission to deny TTD compensation should have been affirmed based
on the Commission’s mistake of law.103 In support of this interpretation, the
dissent presented a strong argument asserting that the majority’s opinion
merely “speculates” that the Commission was “confused regarding how the
absence of ‘good faith’ may be established, and by doing so, the Court
raised arguments that the parties did not make and improperly substituted its
own judgment for the Commission’s findings, instead of following existing
case law and deferring to the Commission’s experience in factual issues.104
Unlike in Ellis or Pacheco, the question of a good faith job offer has
already been decided by Commission in this case, based on at least some
evidence considered and adequately explained in the Commission’s order;
and such factual findings of the good faith of the job offer were not further
disputed by the parties before the Court. 105 As a result, whether Ryan made
a good faith job offer was not a question for the Court to reexamine; the
only remaining question was whether Moss was entitled to TTD
compensation under the circumstances, and the Court answered that
question correctly: an injured worker cannot be awarded TTD compensation
if she refuses a good faith offer of suitable alternative employment, even if
the refusal is also in good faith.106
Therefore, the dissent’s argument that the Commission properly
determined the facts in its discretion but erred in the application of the law
is supported by the record, which brings up the question whether returning
103. Id. at ¶¶ 33, 37.
104. Id. at ¶¶ 33, 36-37. See also State ex rel. Pass v. C.S.T. Extraction Co., 658 N.E.2d 1055,
1058 (1996) (holding that the reviewing court should give deference to the Commission’s expertise in
worker’s compensation cases if the commission’s reasoning is properly explained, as “the commission
alone is responsible for evaluating evidentiary weight and credibility”); State ex rel. Navistar, Inc. v.
Indus. Comm., 153 N.E.3d at 14 (holding that rejecting the factual findings of the commission and
substituting them with the Court’s factual determinations would be “an improper invasion of the
commission’s role as the exclusive fact-finder”).
105. The dissent emphasized that the Commission considered the evidence provided by the parties
and unambiguously rejected Moss’s argument to establish Ryan’s bad faith based on Ms. Plasky’s
testimony and the letter provided to Moss. On appeal, neither the Commission nor Moss disputed the
Commission’s finding of good faith on Ryan’s part, the parties only debated whether under the
circumstances, Moss’s good faith in rejecting the offer would permit her to receive TTD compensation.
Ryan, 2021-Ohio-3539 at ¶¶ 29, 33-35. See also Mobley, 679 N.E.2d at 305 (holding that the “courts
must not micromanage the commission as it carries out the business of compensating for
industrial/occupational injuries and illness,” also, that the standard of review in a mandamus action is not
de novo; thus, deferential to the commission’s expertise, and court should “not substitute their judgment
for the commission’s. . . . Where a commission order is adequately explained and based on some
evidence, even evidence that may be persuasively contradicted by other evidence of record, the order
will not be disturbed as manifesting an abuse of discretion.”).
106. Ryan, 2021-Ohio-3539 at ¶ 14 (majority opinion).
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this case to the Commission for further consideration based on factual issues
of good faith the parties did not raise was an appropriate outcome instead of
affirming the Tenth District’s judgment granting the writ.107 This note
argues that the dissent provided a convincing reasoning for its point that it
was improper for the Court to vacate the Tenth District’s judgment based on
factual issues the parties have not raised, as it is contrary to the nature of our
adversarial system, which “is designed around the premise that the parties
know what is best for them, and are responsible for advancing the facts and
arguments entitling them to relief.”108
iii. In the Absence of a Causal Relationship Between the Loss of
Wages and the Work Injury, Moss is Not Entitled to TTD
Compensation
To be entitled to TTD compensation, “a causal relationship must exist
between the employee’s industrial injury and the loss that the requested
benefit is designed to compensate.”109 As discussed earlier, this causal
relationship is severed and the injured worker is not eligible for TTD
payment “when work within the physical capabilities of the employee is
made available by the employer.”110 If the injured worker is unable to
return to her previous position for reasons unrelated to her work injury, she
is not entitled to TTD compensation.111 Thus, in Ryan, the causal
relationship between Moss’s loss of wages and the injury was severed
because Moss refused Ryan’s job offer due to her “familial obligation” to
care for her grandchild while her daughter was at work, which was
unrelated to her workplace injury.112 Therefore, in the absence of a causal
relationship between Moss’s work injury and her loss of wages, the
Commission erred in concluding that regardless of the existence of a good
faith job offer, Moss was entitled to TTD compensation because she also
acted in good faith rejecting the offer.113
The majority, based on its contention that the Commission was
confused about “what facts can establish bad faith,” vacated the Tenth
107. Id. at ¶¶ 33, 36-37 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
108. Castro v. U.S., 540 U.S. 375, 386 (2003) (Scalia, J. concurring); Ryan, 2021-Ohio-3539 at ¶
36 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
109. Ryan, 2021-Ohio-3539 at ¶ 24 (majority opinion) (quoting State ex rel. McCoy v. Dedicated
Transport, Inc., 776 N.E.2d 51, 59 (2002)).
110. § 4123.56(A).
111. “If a workers’ compensation claimant’s own actions, for reasons unrelated to the injury,
preclude the claimant from returning to a former position of employment, the claimant is not entitled to
temporary total disability benefits since it is the claimant’s own action, rather than the injury, which
precludes a return to the former position.” 94 Ohio Jur. 3d Workers’ Compensation § 212 (citing State
ex rel. Crim v. Ohio Bur. Of Workers’ Comp., 751 N.E.2d 990 (2001)).
112. Ryan, 2021-Ohio-3539 at ¶ 35 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
113. Id.
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District’s judgment and issued a limited writ ordering the Commission to
reconsider the issue.”114 However, it is in the Commission’s discretion to
determine all issues of facts, and the “[mandamus] cannot control the
exercise of discretion unless an abuse of such discretion affirmatively
appears.”115 As discussed above, in Ryan, the parties have not asserted or
disputed any factual questions in Court regarding the existence of a good
faith job offer, thus, the only question debated was whether Moss was
entitled to TTD compensation based on her good faith refusal of the job
offer.116 While the Commission’s factual statements and the record do not
support the majority’s contention that the Commission was confused about
the standard of good faith, the Commission erred in the application of the
law finding that Moss can receive compensation, as the statute and existing
case law expressly bar compensation under these circumstances.117 Thus,
the dissent’s argument that the Commission, “rather than exhibiting
confusion” about the standard to establish Ryan’s good faith, misapplied the
law and abused its discretion by awarding TTD compensation to Moss, is
not without merit, and neither is the contention that because of the absence
of causal relationship between Moss’s loss of wages and her work injury,
the writ should have been granted, ordering the Commission to deny
compensation.118
V.

CONCLUSION

The importance of the Court’s decision lies in the clarification that in
TTD compensation claims, if the employer makes a good faith offer of
suitable alternative employment, and the injured worker refuses to accept it,
even if exercising good faith in doing so, due to familial obligations or for
other justifiable reason, the injured worker is not permitted to receive TTD
compensation.119 Thus, the injured worker’s good faith in rejecting the
offer is not dispositive of the issue of the existence of the employer’s good
faith offer.120
However, the Court’s decision also raises the question of whether the
Court can interfere with the Commission’s exclusive fact-finding authority
either by asserting that the Commission was confused about the standard of
establishing good faith and reexamining and reweighing the evidence that
114. Id. at ¶ 21.
115. Coen, 186 N.E. at 399.
116. Ryan, 2021-Ohio-3539 at ¶ 34. State ex rel. Nicholls v. Indus. Comm., 692 N.E.2d 188, 192
(1998) (finding that in the absence of clear error, a mere possibility of an unspecified error is not
sufficient to invoke the continuing jurisdiction of the Commission).
117. Ryan, 2021-Ohio-3539 at ¶ 33.
118. Id. at ¶¶ 34-35, 37.
119. Id. at ¶¶ 14-15 (majority opinion).
120. Id. at ¶¶ 12, 14.
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supports the Commission’s finding, or by raising new factual arguments the
parties have not raised.121 While the majority held that the case should be
returned to the Commission for determining the question of whether a good
faith offer existed which bars Moss from receiving TTD compensation, the
dissent presented a convincing argument that the question of Ryan’s good
faith offer had already been determined by the Commission and was
therefore not an issue the Court had to decide.122
The only remaining question was whether Moss was eligible for TTD
compensation because she had a good faith reason to refuse Ryan’s good
faith job offer, and the statute provides a clear directive that she was not.123
Arguably, the Commission’s finding that Moss could receive compensation
because both Ryan and Moss acted in good faith is an erroneous application
of the law, as after finding good faith on Ryan’s part, the Commission
should not have considered whether Moss refused to accept the job offer in
good faith.124 Moss rejected the job offer for a reason unrelated to her work
injury; therefore, in the absence of a causal relationship between her loss of
wages and the work-related injury, she is not entitled to TTD
compensation.125 For these reasons, as the dissent argues, affirming the
Tenth District’s judgment granting the writ and ordering the Commission to
deny compensation would have been a justifiable outcome in this case.126
KLAUDIA CAMBRIDGE

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. at ¶¶ 33-37 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Ryan, 2021-Ohio-3539 at ¶¶ 33, 35.
Id. at ¶¶ 14-15 (majority opinion) (citing § 4123.56(A); OHIO ADMIN. CODE 4121-3-32).
Id. at ¶¶ 12, 14, 33 (citing Ellis, 874 N.E.2d at 782).
Id. at ¶ 35 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id. at ¶ 37.
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